사용자:Pectus Solentis/작업실/과학계의 총의
과학계의 총의는 특정 분야를 연구하는 과학자들 사이의 집단으로서의 판단, 입장, 혹은 의견을 말합니다. 총의라는 말은, 반론이 하나도 없는 상태는 아니더라도, 모두가 그 의견에 동의하고 있는 상태를 암시합니다. 과학계의 총의는 그 자체로는 과학계에서의 논쟁에서 기반하지 않으며, 과학적 방법의 일부도 아닙니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 과학계의 총의는 과학계에서의 논쟁과 과학적 방법 모두에 기반하고 있을 수 있습니다.
과학계의 총의는 일반적으로 토의, 출판 과정, 어떤 연구 결과에 대한 다른 과학자들의 재현, 그리고 전문가의 검수 등에 관련된 커뮤니케이션을 통해서 형성됩니다. 그렇기 때문에, 과학계에 종사하는 사람은 그런 논의가 존재한다면 그것을 쉽게 알 수 있으나, 과학계 바깥의 사람들에게 그런 총의가 형성되었다는 것을 말하는 것은 어려울 수 있습니다. 과학이 발전함에 따라 "일반적으로" 이뤄지는 논의마저 과학계 바깥의 사람들에게는 서로 견해가 일치되지 않은 논쟁으로 보일 수가 있기 때문입니다. 어떤 경우엔, 과학 학회가 과학계의 내부에서 외부로 과학계의 입장이 담긴 성명을 발표하기도 합니다. 현재 연구되고 있는 어떤 주제에 대해 이견이 거의 존재하지 않는다면, 그 주제에 대해서는 과학계의 총의를 아주 손쉽게 말할 수 있을 것입니다.
Scientific consensus may be invoked in popular or political debate on subjects that are controversial within the public sphere but which may not be controversial within the scientific community, such as 진화론 or the claimed linkage of MMR vaccinations and autism.
시간이 지남에 따라 총의가 어떻게 바뀔 수 있는가편집
과학계의 총의가 시간에 따라서 어떻게 변화하는지를 주장하는 많은 철학적, 역사적 이론들이 있습니다. 과학이 바뀌어 온 역사는 극도로 복잡하고, 현재의 과학 이론과의 관계에 비추어 과거에 존재했던 과학 이론을 승자와 패자로 나누려는 경향이 있기 때문에, 과학계의 변화에 대해 정확하고 엄정한 이론을 만드는 것은 어렵습니다.  This is made exceedingly difficult also in part because each of the various branches of science functions in somewhat different ways with different forms of evidence and experimental approaches.
과학의 변화를 다루는 대부분의 모델은 과학적 실험을 통해 새로운 데이터가 도출되는 것에 의존합니다. 철학자 칼 포퍼는 실험적 증거가 아무리 많이 모여도 과학 이론을 증명할 수는 없지만 단 하나의 실험적 증거만 있어도 과학 이론을 반박할 수는 있기 때문에, 모든 과학적 발전은 반증의 과정에 기반하고, 과학적 실험들은 현재 이론이 다룰 수 없는 실증적 자료를 얻어냄으로써 새로운 이론이 출현할 당위성을 부여할 수 있을 것이란 희망을 가지고 설계된다고 보았습니다. 
Among the most influential challengers of this approach was the historian Thomas Kuhn, who argued instead that experimental data always provide some data which cannot fit completely into a theory, and that falsification alone did not result in scientific change or an undermining of scientific consensus. He proposed that scientific consensus worked in the form of "paradigms", which were interconnected theories and underlying assumptions about the nature of the theory itself which connected various researchers in a given field. Kuhn argued that only after the accumulation of many "significant" anomalies would scientific consensus enter a period of "crisis". At this point, new theories would be sought out, and eventually one paradigm would triumph over the old one — a cycle of paradigm shifts rather than a linear progression towards truth. Kuhn's model also emphasized more clearly the social and personal aspects of theory change, demonstrating through historical examples that scientific consensus was never truly a matter of pure logic or pure facts. However, these periods of 'normal' and 'crisis' science are not mutually exclusive. Research shows that these are different modes of practice, more than different historical periods.
Lastly, some more radical philosophers, such as Paul Feyerabend, have maintained that scientific consensus is purely idiosyncratic and maintains no relationship to any outside truth. These points of view, while provoking much discussion, have generally not caught on, even with philosophers.[출처 필요]
과학계의 총의와 과학계의 소수파편집
In a standard application of the psychological principle of confirmation bias, scientific research which supports the existing scientific consensus is usually more favorably received than research which contradicts the existing consensus. In some cases, those who question the current paradigm are at times heavily criticized for their assessments. Research which questions a well supported scientific theory is usually more closely scrutinized in order to assess whether it is well researched and carefully documented. This caution and careful scrutiny is used to ensure that science is protected from a premature divergence away from ideas supported by extensive research and toward new ideas which have yet to stand the testing by extensive research. However, this often results in conflict between the supporters of new ideas and supporters of more dominant ideas, both in cases where the new idea is later accepted and in cases where it is later abandoned.
Thomas Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions discussed this problem in detail. Several examples of new concepts gaining acceptance when supported by accumulating evidence are present in the relatively recent history of science. For example:
- the theory of 대륙 이동설 proposed by 알프레드 베게너 and supported by Alexander Du Toit and Arthur Holmes but soundly rejected by most geologists until indisputable evidence and an acceptable mechanism was presented after 50 years of rejection.
- the theory of symbiogenesis presented by Lynn Margulis and initially rejected by biologists but now generally accepted.[출처 필요]
- the theory of punctuated equilibria proposed by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge which is still debated but becoming more accepted in evolutionary theory.
- the theory of prions—proteinaceous infectious particles causing transmissible spongiform encephalopathy diseases—proposed by Stanley B. Prusiner and at first rejected because pathogenicity was believed to depend on nucleic acids now widely accepted due to accumulating evidence.
- the theory of 헬리코박터 파일로리 as the cause of stomach ulcers. This theory was first postulated in 1982 by Barry Marshall and Robin Warren but was widely rejected by the medical community which believed that no bacterium could survive for long in the acidic environment of the stomach. Marshall demonstrated his findings by drinking a brew of the bacteria and consequently developing ulcers, subsequently curing himself with antibiotic medication. In 2005, Warren and Marshall were awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine for their work on H. pylori
Uncertainty and scientific consensus in policy making편집
In public policy debates, the assertion that there exists a consensus of scientists in a particular field is often used as an argument for the validity of a theory and as support for a course of action by those who stand to gain from a policy based on that consensus. Similarly arguments for a lack of scientific consensus are often encouraged by sides who stand to gain from a more ambiguous policy.
People of various backgrounds (political, scientific, media, action groups, and so on) have argued that there is a scientific consensus on the causes of global warming. The historian of science Naomi Oreskes published an article in Science reporting that a survey of the abstracts of 928 science articles published between 1993 and 2003 showed none which disagreed explicitly with the notion of anthropogenic global warming. In an editorial published in the Washington Post, Oreskes stated that those who opposed these scientific findings are amplifying the normal range of scientific uncertainty about any facts into an appearance that there is a great scientific disagreement, or a lack of scientific consensus. Oreskes's findings were replicated by other methods that require no interpretation.
The theory of evolution through natural selection is an accepted part of the science of biology, to the extent that few observations in biology can be understood without reference to natural selection and common descent. Opponents of evolution claim that there is significant dissent on evolution within the scientific community. The wedge strategy, an ambitious plan to supplant scientific materialism seen as inimical to religion, with a religion-friendly theistic science, depended greatly on seeding and building on public perceptions of absence of consensus on evolution. Stephen Jay Gould has argued that creationists misunderstand the nature of the debate within the scientific community, which is not about "if" evolution occurred, but "how" it occurred.
The inherent uncertainty in science, where theories are never proven but can only be disproven (see falsifiability), poses a problem for politicians, policymakers, lawyers, and business professionals. Where scientific or philosophical questions can often languish in uncertainty for decades within their disciplinary settings, policymakers are faced with the problems of making sound decisions based on the currently available data, even if it is likely not a final form of the "truth". The tricky part is discerning what is close enough to "final truth". For example, social action against smoking probably came too long after science was 'pretty consensual'.
Certain domains, such as the approval of certain technologies for public consumption, can have vast and far-reaching political, economic, and human effects should things run awry of the predictions of scientists. However, insofar as there is an expectation that policy in a given field reflect knowable and pertinent data and well-accepted models of the relationships between observable phenomena, there is little good alternative for policy makers than to rely on so much of what may fairly be called 'the scientific consensus' in guiding policy design and implementation, at least in circumstances where the need for policy intervention is compelling. While science cannot supply 'absolute truth' (or even its complement 'absolute error') its utility is bound up with the capacity to guide policy in the direction of increased public good and away from public harm. Seen in this way, the demand that policy rely only on what is proven to be "scientific truth" would be a prescription for policy paralysis and amount in practice to advocacy of acceptance of all of the quantified and unquantified costs and risks associated with policy inaction. Such considerations informed the development of 'the precautionary principle'.
No part of policy formation on the basis of the ostensible scientific consensus precludes persistent review either of the relevant scientific consensus or the tangible results of policy. Indeed, the same reasons that drove reliance upon the consensus drives the continued evaluation of this reliance over time—and adjusting policy as needed.
- http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/abc/consensus.htm (영문)
- Shwed Uri and Peter Bearman, "The Temporal Struture of Scientific Consensus Formation" American Sociological Review 75:6 (December 2010): p. 817-840. Accessed 18 December 2010.
- “Statement on the Teaching of Evolution” (PDF). American Association for the Advancement of Science. 2006년 2월 16일. 2008년 5월 2일에 확인함.
- “NSTA Position Statement: The Teaching of Evolution”. National Science Teacher Association. 2008년 5월 2일에 확인함.
- Pickering, Andrew (1995). 《The Mangle of Practice》. IL: Chicago University Press. ISBN 0-226-66802-9.
- 포퍼, 칼 레이먼드 (1934). 《The Logic of Scientific Discovery》 2002판. 뉴욕: Routledge Classics. ISBN 978-0415278447. 원래는 다음과 같은 독일어 서적으로 출판됨. 《Logik der Forschung : zur Erkenntnistheorie der modenen Naturwissenschaft》. Vienna: Springer. 1935. OCLC 220936200.
- Kuhn (1962). 《The Structure of Scientific Revolutions》 1996판. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. ISBN 978-0226458083.
- Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Atlantic Highlands : Humanities Press, 1975.
- Steve Connor (2005년 10월 4일). “Nobel for scientist who poisoned himself to prove his ulcer theory”. The Independent.
- Naomi Oreskes, "The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change." Science 306:5702 (3 December 2004): p. 1686. Accessed 7 July 2006.
- Naomi Oreskes, "Undeniable Global Warming." Washington Post (26 December 2004): B07.
- Stephen Jay Gould, "Evolution as Fact and Theory," May 1981; in Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994: 253-262.
- The Wedge Document Discovery Institute, 1999.