사용자:Sonchoripark/연습장

콩고 인종 학살은 19세기 말 벨기에가 콩고 자유국이란 괴뢰국가를 세워 수십년 간 약 1500만의 콩고인을 착취하고 학살한 사건을 말한다. 고무 채취를 위해 벨기에의 레오폴 2세는 가혹한 할당량을 채우지 못할 경우 원주민들의 오른손을 자르거나 마을 전체를 몰살시키는 등의 인종 범죄를 저질렀다. 콩고 자유국은 벨기에 본국 면적의 76배에 달하는 아프리카 중서부 지역으로 약 85%가 왕실 개인 소유였다. 경제적 착취와 잔혹 행위가 이어지자 선진 각국이 국제적 인도적 지원 및 잔혹 행위 금지 등 개입을 의결하기도 했다.

배경

고무 수액을 굳혀 만든 전통적 용도의 고무는 덧신 밑창에 대거나 간단한 방수 외투 정도에 쓰였을 뿐이었다. 기온이 내려가면 딱딱하게 굳고 기온이 올라가면 끈적거려 용도는 제한됐다. 찰스 굿이어가 가황처리법(vulcanization)을 발견한 후 고무는 범용성을 가지게 되면서 수요가 무한정 늘어갔다. 존 던롭이 튜브형 고무 타이어를 발명 후 자전거와 자동차가 대중화되면서 그 쓰임새는 기하학적인 비약을 보였다. 고무는 산업화 시대를 뒷받침하는 필수불가결한 재료였다.

아직 인공고무가 발명되기 전이라 고무를 확보하기 위한 각국의 경쟁이 치열해졌다. 19세기 말까지 주 고무 산지는 브라질이었다. 그런데 과도한 고무 수액을 채취로 고무나무가 멸종 위기에 놓였다. 폭등하는 가격에도 물건을 구할 수 없게 되자 영국은 고무나무 씨앗을 비밀리에 들여와 런던 식물원에서 묘목으로 키운 후 아시아 각국에 위치한 자국 식민지에서 플랜테이션을 구축했다. 가장 큰 고무 수입국이었던 영국은 안정적인 공급선을 확보했다.

그러나 만성적인 고무 부족은 해결될 기미가 보이지 않았다. 나무가 완전히 성숙해 수액을 채취할 수 있기까지에도 많은 시간이 필요했으며 1890년대 호황은 고무 가격 폭등을 부채질했다. 열강들은 자국 식민지에 고무 생산 기지를 구축하려 했고, 세계에서 가장 큰 열대 우림을 가진 콩고에 많은 투자를 했지만 실제 수익이 적어 상당한 빚을 지고 있던 레오폴트에게 고무 호경기는 하늘이 부여한 기회였다.

콩고에서 1㎏의 고무를 수집해 앤트워프 본사에 보내는 데에는 1.35프랑의 비용이 들지만，그곳에서 ㎏당 10프랑에 팔렸으므로 수익률이 무려 700%였다. 1890년과 1904년 사이 콩고의 고무 수익은 96배나 늘었다. 당시 콩고는 아프리카에서 가장 수익성이 좋은 식민지였다. 사실 야생 고무 채취 사업에는 수송비를 제외하면 별다른 비용이 들지 않았다. 필요한 것은 오직 노동력뿐이었다.

콩고에서 고무 수액을 채취하는 나무는 긴 넝쿨이 나무를 타고 30m 높이까지 올라가고 그곳에서 가지를 쳐서 다른 나무로 뻗어가는 특징을 지녔다. 원래는 이 넝쿨의 표면을 살짝 벤 다음 그곳에서 나는 수액을 받아야 하지만 넝쿨을 완전히 절단하면 더 빨리 채취할 수 있다. 그렇게 하면 넝쿨이 죽기 때문에 관리들이 금지시켰지만 누구나 그런 식으로 일했다.

그 결과 마을 가까운 곳의 넝쿨들이 사라져갔다. 이제 수액을 채취하려면 점점 먼 곳까지 가야 했고，또 점점 높은 곳으로 기어 올라가야 했다. 높은 나무에서 떨어져 죽는 사람들도 속출했다. 이런 힘든 일을 하려는 사람은 아무도 없었다. 결국 고무 채취 회사는 군대를 동원해 강제로 일을 시켰다. 그들은 마을을 덮쳐 여자들을 볼모로 잡은 다음 마을 사람들이 고무 수액을 가져와야 풀어주었다.

더 많은 양의 고무를 얻기 위해 잔혹한 방식의 할당 제도가 도입됐다. 한 사람이 2주 안에 말린 고무 3~4㎏을 바쳐야 했는데，이 양을 채우려면 숲속에서 한 달에 24일 정도 일해야 했다. 정해진 양을 채우지 못한 사람은 시코트(chicotte · 하마 가죽을 말려서 만든 나선형의 채찍)로 매질을 당했다. 맞다가 의식을 잃는 것이 태반이고 100대 정도를 맞으면 대부분 목숨을 잃었다.

고무 채집에 협력하지 않는 마을은 군대의 공격을 받고 몰살당했다. 유럽 장교들은 아프리카 동맹군에 학살을 대행시키면서 일을 제대로 했다는 증거를 요구했고，그래서 아프리카 군인들은 시체의 오른손을 잘라 훈증 처리해 가져왔다. 그렇지만 군인들은 때로 사냥에 총알을 사용하고는 산 사람의 오른손을 절단해 오기도 했다.

필요한 물자를 조달하는 방식 역시 강압적이었다. 한 장교는 이렇게 증언한다. "흑인 100명의 머리를 자르니까 그 다음부터는 주재소에 물자가 풍부하게 들어오더군요. " 어떤 주재소장은 권총으로 흑인의 귓밥을 쏘아 구멍을 뚫는 것이 취미였다.

마을 사람들이 할당량을 채우기 위해 고무 수액에 흙을 섞자 그것을 흑인에게 강제로 먹인 대리인도 있다. 고무를 채취할 수 있는 넝쿨들이 완전히 멸종할 때까지 열대우림에서는 이런 끔찍한 일들이 계속됐다.

20세기 초 지구의 절반이 스페인 포르투갈 영국 프랑스 네덜란드 독일 미국 벨기에 등 소수 탐욕스러운 제국주의 국가의 소유가 됐다. 그들은 본국에서라면 결코 용인될 수 없는 일들을 해외에서는 기꺼이 저질렀다.

20세기 경제 발전의 그늘에는 레오폴트 같은 잔혹한 제국주의자의 망령이 도사리고 있다.

참고 문헌

• Bourne, Henry Richard Fox (1903). Civilisation in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-doing. London: P. S. King & Son. p. 253. Retrieved 2007-09-26.
• Forbath, Peter (1977). The River Congo: The Discovery, Exploration and Exploitation of the World's Most Dramatic Rivers. Harper & Row. p. 374. ISBN 0-06-122490-1.

외부 링크

한경 경제사 뒤집어 읽기 中 벨기에 왕의 '고무 탐욕'…그 뒤엔 '콩고의 절규'가..編 -2011년 6월 17일 한국경제신문 서울대 서양사학과 주경철 교수 칼럼

다케다 동맹과 서양 무역

미노 번의 동쪽에는 가이 번이 자리하고 있는데 가이 번 다이묘가 그 유명한 다케다 신겐이다. 다케다 씨는 북쪽의 우에스기 신겐 세력과 일진일퇴의 싸움을 계속하고 있었는데, 노부나가는 다케다 씨와 동맹을 맺어 상경전의 위험을 줄이고자 했다. 美濃国において領国を接する甲斐国の武田信玄とは信玄の四男・諏訪勝頼（武田勝頼）に養女（遠山夫人）を娶らせることで同盟を結んだが、遠山夫人は永禄10年（1567年）11月、武田信勝を出産した直後に早世したため、同年末には信長の嫡男・信忠と信玄の六女・松姫との婚姻を模索し友好的関係を持続させるなど、周囲の勢力と同盟を結んで国内外を固めた。 永禄12年（1569年）には、将軍足利義昭と共に武田氏と越後上杉氏との和睦を仲介した（甲越和与）。 天文12年（1543年）に種子島にポルトガル船が到来していた。ポルトガル船は、前年に琉球に到着していたが、琉球人はポルトガル船がマラッカを攻撃して、占領したのを知っていたため交易を拒んだのだった。一方、日本の商人はポルトガル商船との交易を歓迎したためポルトガル船はマラッカから日本に訪れるようになった。 弘治3年（1557年）にポルトガルがマカオの使用権を獲得すると、マカオを拠点として日本・中国・ポルトガルの三国の商品が取引されるようになったのだった。 織田信長．豊臣秀吉は基本的に南蛮貿易を進んで行っていた。スペインはポルトガルに遅れてアメリカ大陸を経由しての太平洋航路を開拓し、ルソン島のマニラを本拠として日本を訪れるようになった。

토요토미 치하

豊臣政権下[編集] その後は豊臣政権に対して協力的で、天正20年（1592年）からの文禄の役、慶長2年（1597年）からの慶長の役のいずれも朝鮮へ渡海して参戦している。 文禄の役では四番隊に所属し1万人の軍役を命ぜられたが、旧態依然とした国元の体制や梅北一揆により、豊臣体制下では生存条件とも成る軍役動員がはかどらず「日本一の遅陣」と面目を失い、四番隊を率いる毛利吉成の後を追って江原道に展開した。また、和平交渉中の文禄2年（1593年）9月、朝鮮滞陣中に嫡男の久保を病気で失っている。 慶長の役では慶長2年（1597年）7月、藤堂高虎らの水軍と連携して朝鮮水軍を挟み撃ちにし、敵将・元均を討ち取った（漆川梁海戦）。8月には南原城の戦いに参加して諸将との全州会議に参加した後、忠清道の扶余まで一旦北上してから井邑経由で全羅道の海南まで南下した。その後、10月末より泗川の守備についた。 日本側の記録によれば、朝鮮の役で義弘は「鬼石曼子（グイシーマンズ）[5]」として朝鮮・明軍から恐れられていたとされている。「島津」のことを発音から、明では「石蔓子」（明史等）、朝鮮では「沈安頓」・「沈安頓吾」（朝鮮王朝実録等）などの表記で記録を残している場合もあり、「鬼石曼子」すなわち「鬼島津」である。ただし、現存する朝鮮側資料に「鬼」を冠した記載は見つかっていない[6]。「鬼石曼子」の表現について朝鮮通信使の一人だった元重挙は『和国誌』で日本側の記録を訳しながら「何を意味するのか分からないが日本の鬼の名のようだ」と記している。 慶長3年（1598年）9月からの泗川の戦いでは、董一元率いる明・朝鮮の大軍（島津報告20万人、『宣祖実録』十月十二日条 中路明軍26800人及び朝鮮軍2215人の計29015人）を7,000人の寡兵で打ち破り、島津家文書では敵兵38,717人を討ち取ったと『征韓録』に記載がある。これは朝鮮側史料の参戦数と照らし合わせれば、夫役に動員された明・朝鮮側の非戦闘員を含めるとしても誇張・誤認の可能性はあるが、徳川家康もこの戦果を「前代未聞の大勝利」と評した。島津側の数字を採用するなら、寡兵が大軍を破った例として世界史にも類例のない大勝利であり、この評判は義弘自身や島津家の軍事能力に伝説性を与え、関ヶ原の戦い、ひいては幕末にまで心理的影響を与えていくことにもなった。なお、このとき義弘は正確な時を知るために7匹の猫を戦場に連れて行ったというエピソードがある[7]。 朝鮮からの撤退が決定し、朝鮮の役における最後の大規模な海戦となった11月の露梁海戦では、立花宗茂らともに順天城に孤立した小西軍救出の為に出撃するが、明・朝鮮水軍の待ち伏せによって苦戦し後退した。しかし明水軍の副将・鄧子龍や朝鮮水軍の主将・李舜臣を戦死させるなどの戦果を上げた。またこの海戦が生起したことで海上封鎖が解けたため、小西行長軍は退却に成功しており、日本側の作戦目的は達成されている。これら朝鮮での功により島津家は加増を受けた。 関ヶ原の戦い[編集] 慶長3年（1598年）の秀吉死後、慶長4年（1599年）には義弘の子・忠恒によって家老の伊集院忠棟が殺害され忠棟の嫡男・伊集院忠真が反乱を起こす（庄内の乱）などの御家騒動が起こる。このころの島津氏内部では、薩摩本国の反豊臣的な兄・義久と、前記庄内の乱に際しても大坂に留まり親豊臣あるいは中立に立つ義弘の間で、家臣団の分裂ないし分離の形がみられる。義弘に本国の島津軍を動かす決定権がなく、関ヶ原の戦い前後で義弘が率いたのは大坂にあった少数の兵士でしかなかった。 慶長5年（1600年）、徳川家康が上杉景勝を討つために軍を起こすと（会津征伐）、義弘は家康から援軍要請を受けて1,000の軍勢を率い、家康の家臣である鳥居元忠が籠城する伏見城の援軍に馳せ参じた。しかし元忠が家康から義弘に援軍要請したことを聞いていないとして入城を拒否したため、西軍総勢4万人の中で孤立した義弘は当初の意志を翻して西軍への参戦を決意した[8]。 だが石田三成ら西軍首脳は、わずかな手勢であったことからか義弘の存在を軽視。美濃墨俣での撤退において前線に展開していた島津隊を見捨てたり、9月14日（10月20日）の作戦会議で義弘が主張した夜襲策[9]が採用されなかったりするなど、義弘が戦意を失うようなことが続いたと言われているが､これは後世に書かれた『落穂集』という二次的な編纂物にしか記載されておらず､また島津方の史料にも夜討ちに関する記事がほとんど見えないことから､この逸話は史実だと断じることはできない[10]｡

関ヶ原の戦いの島津義弘陣跡（岐阜県不破郡関ケ原町） 9月15日（10月21日）の関ヶ原の戦いでは、参陣こそしたものの、戦場で兵を動かそうとはしなかった（一説にはこの時の島津隊は3,000余で、松平・井伊隊と交戦していたとする説もある）。三成の家臣・八十島助左衛門が三成の使者として義弘に援軍を要請したが、「陪臣の八十島が下馬せず救援を依頼した」ため、義弘や甥の島津豊久は無礼であると激怒して追い返し、もはや完全に戦う気を失ったともされている。 関ヶ原の戦いが始まってから数時間、東軍と西軍の間で一進一退の攻防が続いた。しかし14時頃、小早川秀秋の寝返りにより、それまで西軍の中で奮戦していた石田三成隊や小西行長隊、宇喜多秀家隊らが総崩れとなり敗走を始めた。その結果、この時点で300人（1,000人という説もあり）まで減っていた島津隊は退路を遮断され敵中に孤立することになってしまった。この時、義弘は覚悟を決めて切腹しようとしていたが、豊久の説得を受けて翻意し、敗走する宇喜多隊や小西隊の残兵が島津隊内に入り込もうとするのを銃口を向けて追い払い自軍の秩序を守る一方で、正面の伊勢街道からの撤退を目指して前方の敵の大軍の中を突破することを決意する。島津軍は先陣を豊久、右備を山田有栄、本陣を義弘という陣立で突撃を開始した。その際、旗指物、合印などを捨てて決死の覚悟を決意した。 島津隊は東軍の前衛部隊である福島正則隊を突破する。このとき正則は死兵と化した島津軍に逆らう愚を悟って無理な追走を家臣に禁じたが、福島正之は追撃して豊久と激戦を繰り広げた。その後、島津軍は家康の本陣に迫ったところで転進、伊勢街道をひたすら南下した。この撤退劇に対して井伊直政、本多忠勝、松平忠吉らが追撃したが、追撃隊の大将だった直政は重傷を負い忠吉も負傷した（直政はこのとき受けた傷がもとで後年病に倒れ、死去したとされている。また忠吉が負傷したのは開戦当初とする説もある）。しかし、戦場から離脱しようとする島津軍を徳川軍は執拗に追撃し続けた。 このとき島津軍は捨て奸（すてかまり）と言われる、何人かずつが留まって死ぬまで敵の足止めをし、それが全滅するとまた新しい足止め隊を残すという壮絶な戦法を用いた。その結果、甥・豊久や義弘の家老・長寿院盛淳らが義弘の身代わりとなり多くの将兵も犠牲になったが、後に「小返しの五本鑓」と称される者たちの奮戦もあり、井伊直政や松平忠吉の負傷によって東軍の追撃の速度が緩んだことや、家康から追撃中止の命が出されたこともあって、義弘自身はかろうじて敵中突破に成功した。慶長5年（1600年）9月15日関ヶ原の合戦で敗れた義弘主従は、大和三輪山平等寺に逃げ込んで11月28日まで70日間滞在し無事帰国した。無一文であった義弘主従は平等寺社侶たちからの援助によって難波の港より薩摩へと帰還する。その際に義弘は摂津住吉に逃れていた妻を救出し、立花宗茂らと合流、共に海路から薩摩に帰還したという。生きて薩摩に戻ったのは、300人のうちわずか80数名だったといわれる。また、その一方で川上忠兄を家康の陣に、伊勢貞成を長束正家の陣に派遣し撤退の挨拶を行わせている[11]。この退却戦は「島津の退き口」と呼ばれ全国に名を轟かせた。 島津家の存続[編集] 薩摩に戻った義弘は、敗戦の痛手にもめげず薩摩領全土をあげて徳川からの討伐に対する武備を図る姿勢を取って国境を固める一方で、全身全霊を傾けて家康との和平交渉にあたる。ここで義弘は、和平交渉の仲介を関ヶ原で重傷を負わせた井伊直政に依頼した。この選択は賭でもあったが、頼られた直政は誠心誠意、徳川・島津の講和のために奔走している。また関ヶ原で島津勢の捨て身の攻撃を目のあたりにした福島正則の尽力もあったとも言われる。また一方で擬制一族の近衛前久が家康と親しい間柄と言うのもあり、両者の仲介に当たったといわれる。 慶長5年9月30日（1600年11月5日）、当主出頭要請を拒み軍備を増強し続ける島津家の態度に、怒った家康は九州諸大名に島津討伐軍を号令。黒田、加藤、鍋島勢を加えた3万の軍勢を島津討伐に向かわせるが、家康は攻撃を命令できず睨み合いが続いた。関ヶ原に主力を送らなかった島津家には1万を越す兵力が健在であり、戦上手の義弘も健在。もしここで長期戦になり苦戦するようなことがあれば家康に不満を持つ外様大名が再び反旗を翻す恐れがあった。そのため徳川家は交渉で決着をつけようと島津家に圧力をかけていた最中、薩摩沖で幕府が国家運営で行っていた明との貿易船2隻が襲われ沈められると言う凶事が起きてしまう。この事件の黒幕は島津家とされており、もし武力で島津家を潰せば旧臣や敗残兵が海賊集団を結成し、貿易による経済的基盤の脅威になると言ういわば徳川家に対する脅しをかけたとされる。こうした事態から家康は態度を軟化せざるを得ず11月12日（12月17日）、島津討伐軍に撤退を命令した。そして、慶長7年（1602年）に家康は島津本領安堵を決定する。すなわち、「義弘の行動は個人行動であり、当主の義久および一族は承認していないから島津家そのものに処分はしない」また、義弘の処遇も「わし（家康)と義久は仲がいいので義弘の咎めは無しとする」とした。まさに方便ともいうべき論法であるが、こうして島津氏に対する本領の安堵、忠恒（長男は夭折、次男・久保は文禄の役で陣没）への家督譲渡が無事承認された（異説あり）[12]。 島津を誅伐出来なかった家康はこのことが心残りで、死に臨んで遺体を薩摩に向けて葬るように遺言を残したとされる。 晩年[編集] その後、大隅の加治木に隠居した。その後は若者たちの教育に力を注ぎ、元和5年7月21日（1619年8月30日）にこの地で死去。享年85（満83歳没）。このとき、義弘の後を追って13名の家臣が殉死している。

History

Formation

The Subscription Room in the early 19th century.

The market began in Lloyd's Coffee House, opened by Edward Lloyd in around 1688 on Tower Street in the historic City of London. This establishment was a popular place for sailors, merchants, and ship owners, especially those involved in the slave trade, and Lloyd catered to them with reliable shipping news. Historian Eric Williams notes, "Lloyd's, like other insurance companies, insured slaves and slave ships, and was vitally interested in legal decisions as to what constituted 'natural death' and 'perils of the sea.'" Lloyd's quickly obtained a monopoly on maritime insurance related to the slave trade and maintained it up through the early 19th century. Just after Christmas 1691, the shop relocated to Lombard Street (a blue plaque commemorates this location). This arrangement carried on until 1774, long after Lloyd's death in 1713, when the participating members of the insurance arrangement formed a committee and moved to the Royal Exchange on Cornhill as The Society of Lloyd's.

First Lloyd's Act

The Royal Exchange was destroyed by fire in 1838 and, although the building was rebuilt by 1844, many of Lloyd's early records were lost. In 1871, the first Lloyd's Act was passed in Parliament which gave the business a sound legal footing. The Lloyd's Act of 1911 set out the Society's objectives, which include the promotion of its members' interests and the collection and dissemination of information.

It was realised that the membership of the Society, which had been largely made up of market participants, was too small in relation to the market's capitalisation and the risks that it was underwriting. Lloyd's response was to commission a secret internal inquiry, which produced the Cromer report in 1968. This report advocated the widening of membership to non-market participants, including non-British subjects and women, and to reduce the onerous capitalisation requirements (which created a more minor investor known as a "mini-Name"). The report also drew attention to the danger of conflicts of interest.

Changes in the UK financial markets

During the 1970s, a number of issues arose which were to have significant influence on the course of the Society. The first was the tax structure in the UK: capital gains were taxed at 40% (0% on gilts), earned income was taxed in the top bracket at 83%, and investment income in the top bracket at 98%. Lloyd's income counted as earned income, even for Names who did not work at Lloyd's, and this heavily influenced the direction of underwriting: in short, it was desirable for syndicates to make a (small) underwriting loss but a (larger) investment profit. The investment profit was typically achieved by 'bond washing' or 'gilt stripping': buying the gilt or other bond 'ex dividend' and selling it 'cum dividend', creating an income loss and a tax-free capital gain. Syndicate funds were also moved offshore (which later created problems through fraud and self-dealing).

Because Lloyd's acted as a tax shelter in addition to being an insurance market, the second issue affecting Lloyd's was an increase in its external membership, such that, by the end of the decade, the number of passive investors dwarfed the number of underwriters working in the markets. Thirdly, during the decade a number of scandals had come to light, including the collapse of the Sass syndicate, which had highlighted both the lack of regulation and the lack of legal powers of the Committee of Lloyd's (as it was then) to manage the Society.

Arising simultaneously with these developments were wider issues: firstly, in the United States, an ever-widening interpretation by the courts of insurance coverage in relation to workers' compensation for asbestos-related losses, which created a huge, and initially not recognised and then not acknowledged, hole in Lloyd's reserves. Secondly, by the end of the decade, almost all of the market agreements, such as the Joint Hull Agreement, which were effectively cartels mandating minimum terms, had been abandoned under pressure of competition. Thirdly, new specialised policies had arisen which had the effect of concentrating risk: these included "run-off policies", under which the liability of previous underwriting years would be transferred to the current year, and "time and distance" policies, whereby reserves would be used to buy a guarantee of future income.

Second Lloyd's Act

In 1980, Sir Henry Fisher was commissioned by the Council of Lloyd's to produce the foundation for a new Lloyd's Act. The recommendations of his report addressed the 'democratic deficit' and the lack of regulatory muscle.

The Lloyd's Act of 1982 further redefined the structure of the business, and was designed to give the 'external Names', introduced in response to the Cromer report, a say in the running of the business through a new governing Council. The main purpose of the 1982 Act was to separate the ownership of the managing agents of the Lloyd's underwriting syndicates from the ownership of the insurance broking firms (which acted as intermediaries, not as underwriters) with the objective of removing conflicts of interest.

Immediately after the passing of the 1982 Act, evidence came to light, and internal disciplinary proceedings were commenced against a number of individual underwriters who had siphoned sums from their businesses to their own accounts. These individuals included a deputy chairman of Lloyd's, Ian Posgate, and a chairman, Sir Peter Green.

In 1986 the British government commissioned Sir Patrick Neill to report on the standard of investor protection available at Lloyd's. His report was produced in 1987 and made a large number of recommendations but was never implemented in full.

Traumas of the eighties and nineties

In the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s, Lloyd's went through perhaps the most traumatic period in its history. Unexpectedly large legal awards in US courts for punitive damages led to large claims by insureds, especially on APH (asbestos, pollution and health hazard) policies, some dating as far back as the 1940s. Many of these policies were designed to cover all liabilities that were typically excluded on broad-form (wide cover) liability policies.

In the 1980s, Lloyd's was also accused of fraud by several American states and external Names (investors in underwriting syndicates).

Some of the more high-profile accusations included:

• Lloyd's withheld their knowledge of asbestosis and pollution claims until they could recruit more investors to take on these liabilities that were unknown to investors prior to investing in Lloyd's;
• enforcement officials in 11 US states charged Lloyd's and some of its associates with various wrongs such as fraud and selling unregistered securities;
• Ian Posgate, one of Lloyd's leading underwriters and its deputy chairman, was charged with skimming money from investors and secretly trying to buy a Swiss bank; he was later acquitted.

Asbestosis and unforeseen risk

The classic example of long-tail insurance risks is asbestosis/mesothelioma claims under employers' liability or workers' compensation insurances. A worker at an industrial plant may have been exposed to asbestos in the 1960s, fallen ill 20 years later, and claimed compensation from his former employer in the 1990s. The employer would report a claim to the insurance company that wrote the policy in the 1960s. However, because the insurer did not understand the full nature of the future risk back in the 1960s, it and its reinsurers would not have properly reserved for it. In the case of Lloyd's this resulted in the bankruptcy of thousands of individual investors who indemnified (via RITC) general liability insurance written from the 1940s to the mid-1970s for companies with exposure to asbestosis claims.

'Recruit to dilute'

Reinsurance to close

It may be wondered how the current Members of Lloyd's could be liable to pay these historical losses. This came about as a result of the Lloyd's accounting practice known as 'reinsurance to close' (RITC).

Membership of a Lloyd's syndicate was not like owning shares in a company. An individual "joined" for one calendar year only – known as the 'Lloyd's annual venture'. At the end of the year, the syndicate as an ongoing trading entity was effectively disbanded.

However, usually the syndicate re-formed for the next calendar year with more or less the same membership and the same identifying number. In this way, a syndicate could have a continuous existence going back (in some cases) 50 years or more, but each year was accounted for separately. There would have been 50 separate incarnations of the syndicate, each one a separate trading entity that underwrote insurance for one calendar year only.

Since claims take time to be reported and paid, the profit or loss for each syndicate took time to become apparent. The practice at Lloyd's was to wait three years (that is, 36 months from the beginning of the year in which the business was written) before "closing" the year for accounting purposes and declaring a result.

For example, a 2003 syndicate would ordinarily declare its results following the end of December 2005. The syndicate's members would be paid any underwriting (and investment) profit during the 2006 calendar year, in proportion to their participation in the syndicate; conversely, they would have to reimburse the syndicate during 2006 for their share of any loss.

To arrive at the profit or loss, reserves were set aside for future claims payments, that is, both reserves for claims that had been notified but not yet paid, and also estimated amounts required for claims that had been incurred but not reported (IBNR). The estimation process is difficult and can be inaccurate; in particular, liability (or long-tail) policies tend to produce claims long after the policies are written.

The reserve for future claims liabilities was set aside in an unusual way. The syndicate bought a reinsurance policy to pay any future claims; the premium was equal to the amount of the reserve. In other words, rather than putting the reserve into a bank to earn interest, the syndicate transferred its (strictly, its members') liability to pay future claims to a reinsurer. This was RITC – a transaction that allowed the syndicate to be closed, and a profit or loss declared.

The reinsurer was always another Lloyd's syndicate(s), often the succeeding year of the same syndicate. The members of Syndicate X in 2004 reinsured the future claims liabilities for members of Syndicate X in 2003. The membership might be the same, or it might have changed.

In this manner, liability for past losses could be transferred year after year until it reached the current syndicate. A member joining a syndicate with a long history of such transactions could – and often did – pick up liability for losses on policies written decades previously. So long as the reserves had been correctly estimated, and the appropriate RITC premium paid every year, then all would have been well, but in many cases this had not been possible. No one could have predicted the surge in APH losses. Therefore, the amounts of money transferred from earlier years by successive RITC premiums to cover these losses were insufficient, and the current members had to pay the shortfall.

(By contrast, within a stock company, an initial reserve for future claims liabilities is set aside immediately, in year 1. Any deterioration in that initial reserve in subsequent years will result in a reduced profit in the later years, and a consequently reduced dividend and/or share price for shareholders in those later years, whether or not those shareholders in the later year are the same as the shareholders in year 1. Arguably, Lloyd's practice of using reserves in year 3 to establish the RITC premiums should have resulted in a more equitable handling of long-tail losses such as APH than would the stock company approach. Nevertheless, the difficulties in correctly estimating losses such as APH overwhelmed even Lloyd's extended process.)

As a result, a great many individual members of syndicates underwriting long-tail liability insurance at Lloyd's faced financial loss by the mid-1990s.

Dilution of liabilities and the consequences

It was alleged that, in the early 1980s, some Lloyd's officials began a recruitment programme to enroll new Names to help capitalise Lloyd's prior to the expected onslaught of APH claims. This allegation became known as 'recruit to dilute': in other words, recruit Names to dilute losses. When the huge extent of asbestosis losses came to light in the early 1990s, for the first time in Lloyd's history large numbers of members refused or were unable to pay the claims, many alleging that they were the victims of fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence. The opaque system of accounting at Lloyd's made it difficult, if not impossible, for many Names to understand the extent of the liability that they personally and their syndicates subscribed to.

The market was forced to restructure. An ambitious plan entitled Reconstruction and Renewal was produced in 1995, with proposals for separating the ongoing Lloyd's from its past losses. Liability for all pre-1993 business was to be compulsorily transferred (by RITC) into a special vehicle called Equitas, which would require the approval of the UK's Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) at a cost of around $21 billion. Many Names faced large bills, but the plan also provided for a settlement of their disputes, a tax on recent profits, and the write-off of nearly $ 5 billion of debts - skewed towards those with the biggest losses. The plan was debated at length, modified, and eventually strongly supported by the Association of Lloyd's Members (ALM) and most leaders of Names' Action Groups. Money was raised in many ways, including the sale and leaseback of Lloyd's building, and a tax on future business. Individual offers were accepted by 95% of Lloyd's Names. The past liabilities of all Names were transferred to Equitas in September 1996.

The 'recruit to dilute' fraud allegations were heard in court in 2000 in the case Sir William Jaffray & Ors v. The Society of Lloyd's (see first instance judgment) and the appeal was heard in 2002. On each occasion the allegation that there had been a policy of "recruit to dilute" was rejected; however, at first instance the judge described the Names as "the innocent victims [...] of staggering incompetence" and at appeal the court found (see appeal judgment) that representations that Lloyd's had a rigorous auditing system were false ([item 376 of the judgment:] [...] the answer to the question [...] whether there was in existence a rigorous system of auditing which involved the making of a reasonable estimate of outstanding liabilities, including unknown and unnoted losses, is no. Moreover, the answer would be no even if the word 'rigorous' were removed.) and strongly hinted that one of Lloyd's main witnesses, Murray Lawrence, a previous chairman, had lied in his testimony ([item 405 of the judgment:] We have serious reservations about the veracity of Mr. Lawrence's evidence [...].).

Lloyd's then instituted some major structural changes. Corporate members with limited liability were permitted to join and underwrite insurance. No new "unlimited" Names can join (although a few hundred existing ones remained). Financial requirements for underwriting were changed, to prevent excess underwriting that was not backed by liquid assets. Market oversight has significantly increased. Lloyd's rebounded and started to thrive again after the September 11 attacks, but it has faced increased competition from newly created companies in Bermuda and other markets.

Structure

Lloyd's is not an insurance company; it is an insurance market of members. As the oldest continuously active insurance marketplace in the world, Lloyd's has retained some unusual structures and practices that differ from all other insurance providers today. Originally created as a non-incorporated association of subscribing members, it was incorporated by the Lloyd's Act 1871 and is currently governed under the Lloyd's Acts of 1871 through to 1982.

Lloyd's itself does not underwrite insurance business, leaving that to its members. Instead, the Society operates effectively as a market regulator, setting rules under which members operate and offering centralised administrative services to those members.

Council of Lloyd's

The Council meets in the Adam Room, on the top floor of the Lloyd's building

The Lloyd's Act 1982 defines the management structure and rules under which Lloyd's operates. Under the Act, the Council of Lloyd's is responsible for the management and supervision of the market. It is regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.

The Council normally has six working, six external and six nominated members. The appointment of nominated members, including that of the chief executive officer, is confirmed by the Governor of the Bank of England. The working and external members are elected by Lloyd's members. The chairman and deputy chairmen are elected annually by the Council from among the working members of the Council. All members are approved by the regulating bodies.

The Council can discharge some of its functions directly by making decisions and issuing resolutions, requirements, rules and byelaws. The Council delegates most of its daily oversight roles, particularly relating to ensuring the market operates successfully, to the Franchise Board.

The Franchise Board lays down guidelines for all syndicates and operates a business planning and monitoring process to safeguard high standards of underwriting and risk management, thereby improving sustainable profitability and enhancing the financial strength of the market.

Businesses at Lloyd's

Interior escalators linking the underwriting floors of the Lloyd's building

There are two classes of people and firms active at Lloyd's. The first are Members, or providers of capital. The second are agents, brokers, and other professionals who support the Members, underwrite the risks and represent outside customers (for example, individuals and companies seeking insurance or insurance companies seeking reinsurance).

Members

For most of Lloyd's history, rich individuals (Names) backed policies written at Lloyd's with all of their personal wealth (unlimited liability). Since 1994, Lloyd's has allowed corporate members into the market, with limited liability. The losses in the early 1990s devastated the finances of many Names (upwards of 1,500 out of 34,000 (4.4%) Names were declared bankrupt) and scared away others. Today, individual Names provide only 14% of capacity at Lloyd's, with UK-listed and other corporate members providing 31% and the remainder via the international insurance industry. No new Names with unlimited liability are admitted, and the importance of individual Names will continue to decline as they slowly withdraw, convert (generally, now, into Limited Liability Partnerships) or die.

Managing agents

Managing agents sponsor and manage syndicates. They canvas members for commitments of capacity, create the syndicate, hire underwriters, and oversee all of the syndicate's activities. Managing agents may run more than one syndicate.

Members' agents

Members' agents co-ordinate the members' underwriting and act as a buffer between Lloyd's, the managing agents and the members. They were introduced in the mid-1970s and grew in number until many went bust; many of the businesses merged, and there are now only four left (Argenta, Hampden, Alpha and LMAS, which has no active Names). It is mandatory that unlimited Names write through a members' agent, and many limited liability members choose to do so.

Recent results have benefited from tougher underwriting standards imposed by the Franchise Board and improved terms and conditions following widespread underwriting losses during the period 1998 to 2001, the September 11 attacks, and large hurricane-related property and energy claims in both 2004 and 2005.

Lloyd's coverholder

Coverholders are an important source of business for Lloyd's. Their numbers have increased steadily in recent years, and there are now about 2,500 Lloyd's coverholders producing around 30% of Lloyd's premium income each year. The balance of Lloyd's business is distributed around the world through a network of brokers. Coverholders allow Lloyd's syndicates to operate in a region or country as if they were a local insurer. This is achieved by Lloyd's syndicates delegating their underwriting authority to coverholders. A coverholder can have full or limited authority to underwrite on behalf of a Lloyd's syndicate. It will usually issue the insurance documentation and will often handle claims. The document setting out the terms of the coverholder's delegated authority is known as a binding authority.

Lloyd's brokers

Outsiders, whether individuals or other insurance companies, cannot do business directly with Lloyd's syndicates. They must hire Lloyd's brokers, who are the only customer-facing companies at Lloyd's. They are therefore often referred to as intermediaries. Lloyd's brokers shop customers' policies among the syndicates, trying to obtain the best prices and terms.

Integrated Lloyd's vehicles

When corporations became admitted as Lloyd's members, they often disliked the traditional structure. Insurance companies did not want to rely on the underwriting skills of syndicates they did not control, so they started their own. An integrated Lloyd's vehicle (ILV) is a group of companies that combines a corporate member, a managing agent, and a syndicate under common ownership. Some ILVs allow minority contributions from other members, but most now try to operate on an exclusive basis.

Market structure

• Capital
  • 1,239 corporate members
  • 773 individual Names with unlimited liability
• Market participants
  • 56 managing agents
  • 91 syndicates
  • 181 Lloyd's brokers

Lloyd's is not publicly traded, though some of its members are listed companies, such as Hiscox Ltd, Catlin Group Ltd and Hardy Underwriting Bermuda Ltd.

Financial security

Lloyd's capital structure, often referred to as the Chain of Security, provides financial security to policyholders and capital efficiency to members. The Corporation is responsible for setting both member and central capital levels to achieve a level of capitalisation that is robust and allows members the potential to earn superior returns.

There are three 'links' in the chain: the funds in the first and second links are held in trust, primarily for the benefit of policyholders whose contracts are underwritten by the relevant member. Members underwrite for their own account and are not liable for other members' losses.

The third link — the Central Fund — contains mutual assets held by the Corporation which are available, subject to Council approval, to meet any member's insurance liabilities.

Timeline of significant events at Lloyd's

• 1688 Opening of Lloyd's Coffee House on Tower Street
• 1691 Lloyd's Coffee House relocates to Lombard Street
• 1774 Foundation of the Society of Lloyd's at the Royal Exchange
• 1799 Sinking of HMS Lutine
• 1871 Lloyd's Act 1871
• 1906 San Francisco earthquake
• 1911 Lloyd's Act 1911
• 1912 Sinking of RMS Titanic
• 1925 Market relocates to its first owned building at 12 Leadenhall Street
• 1955 Supported the Montgomery Bus Boycott
• 1958 Market relocates to new Lloyd's building at 51 Lime Street
• 1965 Hurricane Betsy
• 1968 Cromer report
• 1977 Sasse syndicate scandal
• 1978 Amoco Cadiz disaster
• 1978 Computer leasing
• 1979 Three Mile Island accident
• 1982 Lloyd's Act 1982
• 1986 Market relocates to new Lloyd's building at 1 Lime Street
• 1988 Piper Alpha disaster
• 1989 Lloyd's Community Programme founded with first chairman Michael Wade
• 1990 Asbestosis affair and resulting London market excess (LMX) spiral
• 1993 Bishopsgate bombing and subsequent establishment of Pool Re
• 1996 Equitas set up
• 2001 September 11 attacks
• 2006 Berkshire Hathaway assumes Equitas liabilities
• 2011 Great East Japan earthquake
• 2013 Inga Beale appointed first female chief executive officer of Lloyd's

Types of policies

Lloyd's syndicates write a diverse range of policies, both direct insurance and reinsurance, covering casualty, property, marine, energy, motor, aviation and many other types of risk. Lloyd's has a unique niche in unusual, specialist business such as kidnap and ransom, fine art, aviation, marine, satellite, bloodstock and other insurances.

The general public knows Lloyd's for some unusual or notable policies it has written. For example, Lloyd's has insured:

• silent film comedian Ben Turpin's eyes against uncrossing
• Marlene Dietrich's, Betty Grable's, Brooke Shields's, and Tina Turner's legs
• cricketer Merv Hughes's trademark walrus mustache while playing for Australia between 1985 and 1994
• Jimmy Durante's nose
• the hands of the 1932 World Yo-Yo Champion Harvey Lowe
• Keith Richards' fingers
• food critic and gourmet Egon Ronay's taste buds for £250,000
• Whitney Houston's, Toni Braxton's, Celine Dion's, Bob Dylan's and Bruce Springsteen's vocal cords
• Michael Flatley's legs for $47 million (the policy was only in effect when he was touring, and forbade him from dancing except on stage)
• America Ferrera's smile for $10 million
• Ken Dodd's teeth for $7.4 million
• Tempest Storm's breasts
• Steve Fossett's life for $50 million
• the bodies of several professional wrestlers, including Bret Hart, Ric Flair, Curt Hennig, Rick Rude, Brian Adams, and Joe Laurinaitis, better known as Road Warrior Animal
• Diana Lee's hair
• Troy Polamalu's hair for $1 million
• Holly Madison's breasts for $1 million
• participating automobiles in the carpools involved in the Montgomery Bus Boycott
• a grain of rice with a portrait of the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh engraved on it for $20,000
• a confident comedy theatre group against the risk of a member of their audience dying of laughter
• the development of the new World Trade Center with workers' compensation, general liability, excess liability and speciality insurance programmes

Miscellaneous

The Lutine Bell is housed in the rostrum in the main Underwriting Room

The present Lloyd's building, at 1 Lime Street, was designed by architect Richard Rogers and was completed in 1986. It stands on the site of the old Roman Forum. The 1925 facade still survives, appearing strangely stranded with the modern building visible through the gates on the northern side on Leadenhall Street. In 2011 it was listed as a Grade I building by heritage minister John Penrose.

In the great Underwriting Room of Lloyd's stands the Lutine Bell, which was struck when the fate of a ship "overdue" at its destination port became known. If the ship was safe, the bell would be rung twice; if it had sunk, the bell would be rung once. (This had the practical purpose of immediately stopping the sale or purchase of "overdue" reinsurance on that vessel.) Now it is only rung for ceremonial purposes, such as the visit of a distinguished guest (two rings), or for the annual Remembrance Day service and anniversaries of major world events (one ring).

The early history of Lloyd's was fictionalized in the 1936 film Lloyd's of London.

The Lloyd's building was used in the beginning of the film Mamma Mia! to represent a New York office building from where Pierce Brosnan's character left for the Greek island.

Lloyd's was named Business Insurance Readers Choice winner 2007 for Best Reinsurance Company.

Lloyd's is also the main plotline in English author Penny Vincenzi's novel An Absolute Scandal (2007), which centres around the scandals during the 1980s and 1990s told via a large ensemble cast.

See also

• BS 1088 – Marine materials standard
• Jonathan's Coffee-House – original home of the London Stock Exchange
• Lloyd's List
• Lloyd's Register
• Lloyd's unlimited rating
• Marine insurance
• Shipping line

Further reading

• Cuthbert Heath: Maker of the Modern Lloyd's of London by Antony Brown. Illustrated with black-and-white photographic plates, which include the Twin Towers in New York, with a colour frontispiece of 'The Room' at Lloyd's (Originally supplied in cardboard box). From a copy of Cuthbert Heath Published by David and Charles UK in 1980 with ISBN 0-7153-7942-9.
• Hazard Unlimited:The Story of Lloyd's of London by Antony Brown.
• Raphael, Adam, Ultimate Risk: the inside story of the Lloyd's catastrophe (London, Four Walls Eight Windows, 1994, ISBN 978-1-56858-056-2).
• On The Brink:How a Crisis Transformed Lloyd's of London by Andrew Duguid, Palgrave Macmillan, August 2014, ISBN 9781137299291.

External links

• Lloyd's official web site
• Lloyd's Agency Department
• Special report on Lloyd's in The Economist (18 September 2004)
• Time magazine report on Lloyd's (February 21t., 2000)
• Independent analysis of Lloyd's
• Association of Lloyd's Members
• USA Today Q&A with CEO Richard Ward, September 2008

Data

• Yahoo! – Lloyd's Company Profile
• Lloyd's of London's webcam
• Lloyd's litigation database
• Commentary on Lloyd's

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